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ARGUING FOR ECONOMIC EQUALITY

Egalitarians
philosophical

suffer

from

confusion.

a typical

We know that we

believe in equality, but we don't seem to be
able to say what equality
reason,

is.

Part of the

no doubt, is that there are genuine

disputes about what equality involves.

But in

the first part of this paper, I will argue that a
central

reason

is that egalitarianism

is a

rather complex system of beliefs which upsets
several

philosophical

pictures

'hold

unable

to

belief-system

prejudices.

us captive',
see

the

so that we are

character
l

Various
of

the

By uncovering this

before us.

complexity and these prejudices we may hope
to avoid the idea that egalitarianism
of a certain form.

must be

We will then be free to

engage in the really difficult work of giving
an adequate

account of what egalitarianism

is. The second part of this paper is an attempt
to do some of this work in connection with the
idea of economic equality.

In Part III, I say a

little about how I would argue in favour of the
conception
developed.

of

economic

equality
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so

PART I: What equality is not
1.1. Egalitarianism

is not a belief in a single

principle
The first

prejudice

philosophers

are

likely to have is the idea that egalitarianism
must be a belief in a single principle.
would

think

that

about

Nobody

Christianity

or

Buddhism, but then they have the advantage
that their names derive from the name of a
founder

and

not

a concept.

Yet

these

examples remind us that names of systems of
belief are inevitably forms of shorthand.

They

need to be deciphered.
What, then, are we to make of the name
'egalitarianism'?

Not that it is a belief in a

single, simple thing called equality, but that
the beliefs

it involves

do somehow

derive

from or revolve around that concept.

It is

perfectly

that

intelligible

egalitarianism

to

suppose

comprises a number of beliefs,

each of which can be construed somehow as a
principle of equality.

There is no need for

them to have any more in common than that
(cf. PI 65).
If we look at the beliefs of people who
consider themselves

][][][][][][][

egalitarians,

2

we actually

m0[][][][][

find a variety of principles.

Here are some of

the beliefs I'd include (see Baker 1987: ch.1)
(1)

Everyone has the right to the satisfaction

of their

basic

needs;

in a good

everyone

would

existence,

but the prospect

have not just

society

a bearable

of a satisfying,

fulfilling life.
(2)

No one should be degraded or exploited.

Everyone should have the same social status.
(3)

There should be much more equality of

income and wealth.

There should be equality

in production, involving democratic control of
the economy

and of the workplace,

right of everyone

to safe, dignified,

and engaging work.
to develop

and the

their

useful,

Everyone should be able
individual

talents

in a

satisfying and fulfilling way.
(4)

Civil rights

like free speech and free

assembly should be defended, but institutions
should be developed to give formal freedoms
real bite, and to give their members

equal

power.
(5)

No one should be treated

others

because

preference,
religion

of

their

or lack

their

colour

sex

worse than
or

or culture,

their

of it, or for any other

irrelevant reason.

][]O[m [][][

sexual
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Of course,

not

every

contemporary

egalitarian will subscribe to just these beliefs,
but I am reasonably
real-life

confident

egalitarians

would

that most

have a set of

beliefs at this level of complexity.
Now, for many practical purposes, such
a radical ideal might well be called an ideal
of equality

of outcome

or condition,

to

distinguish it from weaker ideals. That can be
a

convenient

and

summarizing

a complex

philosophers

are

simpler

way

view.

of

But when
with

this

that

it is

of some more fundamental

and

complexity,

they

derivative

harmless

belief

egalitarianism.

confronted
tend

which

to say
is

the

essence

of

The problem is that none of

the candidates proposed for this role is up to
the job.

Consider

the principle

of equal

well-being put forward by Mortimore (1968).
It is a plausible principle, but it clearly goes
considerably

beyond the beliefs I have listed.

Egalitarians,

as far as I can see, are simply

not committed

to rectifying

every cause of

inequality of well-being (political frustration,
expensive
which

tastes,

is what

Dworkin

(1981)

welfare.

And

philosophical
makes

these

in his
although

m[][]mHH
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ennui)

--

so useful

to

attack

on equal

egalitarians

m[]mm [][

are

sensitive to systematic or extreme differences
in esteem,

affection,

job-satisfaction,

and

overall contentment

with life, they are by no

means

to evening

committed

differences
plausibly

completely.

out

these

All that can really

be said is that some egalitarian

beliefs

involve

well-being

something

like

limited

spheres:

within

equal
for

instance, the belief in satisfying basic needs
might be construed as a belief that everyone
should be brought
basic well-being.3
If equal
principle,

up to the same level of

well-being

then equality

is too strong
of resources

a

in the

form defended by Dworkin (1981) is too weak.
Dworkin's theory is essentially a refinement of
the liberal

idea of equality

of opportunity.

Although he distances himself from what he
calls

the 'starting

'resources'

gate theory

of justice',

here are still things which people

use to further
which could

their interests
lead to major

need-satisfaction,

in a manner
inequalities

life-fulfilment,

of

status,

income,

and economic

power,

and thus to

results

well

what

is

countenanced

outside

by egalitarians.

typically
Dworkin

rightly argues that any theory of equality must
go beyond pre-analytic dogma, but his theory

][] 0 0 0 [][][
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moves

so

far

egalitarianism

away

from

everyday

that it fails to count

as an

elucidation of that outlook at all.
A third single-principle

theory is that

everyone should have a roughly equal level of
the kinds of thing Rawls (1972) calls primary
social goods.

By contrast with Dworkin, this

could be seen as an equality of 'results' rather
than

of

'opportunity',

although

that

terminology is not wholly satisfactory because
some

primary

opportunities.

goods

are

themselves

It would include, for instance,

equality of income and wealth, of access to
health care and to educational

provision,

political power, of social status.
this is closer to real-life

And surely

egalitarianism

the two principles already considered.
is still a long way from

of
than

But it

the truth.

For

instance, it does not adequately encompass
commitment
different

to

needs,

the

satisfaction

a

of very

nor does it seem to make

room for the egalitarian

ideal that everyone

should have access to a satisfying occupation
and to an appropriate education.
of

egalitarianism

differences

between

are

all

people

These areas
sensitive

to

which call for

differences in material provision and therefore
for differences in primary social goods.

m O[m [][][
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That

is only to say that the strengths
weaknesses
of this
principle

and
are

complementary to those of equal well-being.
Equality of well-being takes into account too
many personal differences, equality of goods
too few.
There is no guarantee that other
candidates for single-principle egalitarianism
will meet the same fate, but the examples
given so far should raise our suspicions.4 For
real-life egalitarianism manages to combine
some of the aspects of each single principle it
is supposed to be based on. It may be argued
that such an eclecticism runs the risk of
confusion and inconsistency, but that doesn't
make equality impossible. If the context
makes the content of an egalitarian's outlook
reasonably clear, if the potential conflict
among its elements is containable, and if
there are theoretical resources available for
sorting out particular conflicts in particular
ways, egalitarianism can manage to survive.
But where are these resources? Are they not
part of egalitarianism itself? This brings me
nicely to the second claim I wish to defend.
1.2. Egalitarianism

is not a belief in an

'ultimate principle'

][] 0 0 0 [][][
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Utilitarianism
theories

and several other moral

are identified

allegedly

ultimate

in terms

principles.

natural to imagine

of their
It seems

that egalitarianism

is of

the same form:

that at its base is some

ultimate principle

from which all its other

characteristics

follow.

But the image

is

illusory, and not just because equality is not a
single principle.
The main reason
simply

that

principles.

there

that it is illusory

are

no

such

is

ultimate

This is not the place to argue the

general position against foundationalism

(for

examples of which, see Baker 1980, Lovibond
1983, or Williams 1985). But the case can be
illustrated by looking at a principle which is
often taken to be the fundamental principle of
equality, namely equal respect.
that principle is extremely
to interpretation;
misleading.

First of all,

general and open

thus its simple appearance is

According to some philosophers,

it stands for only the most minimal form of
respect

(Lucas

1977), while for egalitarian

authors

it is even at the start much more

robust.

Secondly, the most common way of

supporting

it as a fundamental

hopelessly

incomplete

principle

(see Williams

is

1962,

Rawls 1972, and Lukes 1977 for examples).

][] []O[][] [][
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The argument

always comes to a halt with

just the claim which needs to be justified:
that

the

particular

characteristics

common

human

which are supposed to 'entitle'

or 'command' or 'elicit' respect (the words are
all Lukes's) really do so. But this is the kind
of thing that always happens when you try to
conjure a belief out of thin air: you end up, at
best, with an enthymeme,

and at worst with

an incantation.
Taken as an enthymeme,

the argument

might be seen as follows:
(1)

All humans have the capacity to think,

to make decisions,

to pursue activities

they

find fulfilling, and so on. (Well, almost all.)
(2)

These capacities

(First suppressed

are all very valuable.

premise, which is itself an

ethical judgment.)
(3)

Anything

deserves

with

valuable

our respect.

(Second

properties
suppressed

premise, and another ethical judgment.)
Therefore,
(4)

All humans are worthy of respect.
Once anyone

opened
argument,

sees the cans of worms

up by that

way

they might well be forgiven

retaining it as an incantation
positive

of reading
only.

the
for

But the

point to note is that it is indeed

][JD 0 Dr] [][
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possible to provide arguments
fundamental

principles,

for so-called

but only by using

other principles which are themselves open to
further justification.

'Justification comes to an

end', not at fundamental principles, but at the
point at which, in a particular
with a particular
justify

(cf.

obviously,

PI
will

audience,
326,

context

and

it suffices

485).

That

be different

to

point,

on different

occasions.
What,

then,

are we to make

natural idea that some principles
are more fundamental

of the

of equality

than others?

The idea

is all right as a general rule; what is wrong is
trying to put too much weight on it. To say
that one principle is more fundamental

than

another means only that the first is a reason
for the second but not vice versa.

That can

vary according to context, and it will fail to
order

such

reinforcing.

principles

as

are

mutually

The foundational style of thinking

thus ignores the way in which, for instance,
the principles of need-satisfaction

and mutual

respect can support each other (Baker 1987:
18, 24).
But the urge to conceive egalitarianism
in terms of fundamental principles is not only
an

instance

of

lD 0 [][][] m

a general
10

][]

philosophical

[][]O 0 m

mistake.

It

over-simplify

also

leads

egalitarians

what distinguishes

to

them from

other points of view.

The difference becomes

a single

when

in reality

multitude

of

difference,

composed

of

a

it is

specific

differences, held together by a whole network
of reasons.

And although these reasons are

indeed mutually
means

reinforcing,

so monolithic

they are by no

as to constitute

outlook

which

Instead,

we find in the real world a wide

range

of

has

more

a single

an

or

less

alternative.

anti-egalitarian

positions, as well as a great diversity among
egalitarian

views.

easier to understand

This diversity

when we recognise that

forms of egalitarianism
different

are not all simply

interpretations

fundamental

idea.

becomes

of

the

For how could a single

idea have so many interpretations?
only

a few,

intelligent

these

The

answer

lies in abandoning

presupposition,
version

could

And if
few

lead

people to such widely divergent

conclusions?
questions

how

same

of

to

all

their common

and in recognising
egalitarianism

is

network of beliefs supported

11

][]

that each

a complex

by a complex

network of argument.

JD0 [][] [][] [
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The

foundational

egalitarianism
creates

conception

of

is also a practical liability.

the impression

that

equality must be conducted

the case

It
for

in very abstract

terms, remote from everyday moral thinking.
For

that

is the

justifications

level

at which

for 'respect

general

for persons'

similar principles must proceed.

and

By contrast,

I tried to show in Arguing for Equality that the
case for equality

can be made in terms of

very ordinary beliefs, beliefs which you don't
have to be a philosopher

to understand.

The

argument can thus simply by-pass the areas in
which philosophers

have sought to confine it,

and instead of talking generally about respect
for persons,
principles

it can employ

-- for instance,

more

the principle

people are not to be degraded
Even

those

interpretation,
break down.

specific

principles

that

or exploited.

are

and the argument

open

to

is liable to

But without some specificity, it

will never even get started.
1.3. Egalitarianism

is not

an immutable

doctrine
The idea that egalitarianism
In a single, fundamental
with a third philosophical

][] mU][] m
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is a belief

principle

goes well

prejudice
][] [][] [][]

m

-- that

egalitarianism
doctrine.

is
By

a timeless,

contrast,

anti-foundationalist
view

of

tradition,

changeless

a pluralist

approach

egalitarianism

and

allows~for

as

a

a

changing

each stage of which is a natural

outgrowth of the last, but in which no stage is
privileged as a final wisdom.
Philosophers

are liable

stages as expressions

to see these

of a single programme,

and to assume that 'egalitarianism'

must stand

for a fixed set of beliefs, however complex
and non-foundational:

a standard

against

which all other beliefs may be compared (cf.
PI 67-68).

There is something

view and something wrong.
that from any particular

right in this

What is right is

perspective

in the

history of equality, some views are going to
be more egalitarian

than others.

Thus, for

instance, the belief in equal opportunity, once
at the forefront of egalitarianism,
truth, a rather inegalitarian

is now, in

belief.

This kind

of unfolding of a tradition does not have to be
conceptualised

in terms of an ultimate idea to

which various stages only approximate.
be seen, unmetaphysically,
which certain

It can

as a process

ways of thinking,

in

combined

with social change, lead on to new ways of
thinking.

What

lD D[][][] m

makes
13

][]

all

these

[][]O [] m

ways

egalitarian is not that they have the same
content, but that they do lead, and have led,
from one to another and that the term
'equality' has continued to have a central role
in their expression.
104. The principles of equality are not of the

same logical form
The final claim I want to make in the
first part of this paper is that the principles of
equality take at least four different forms.
The first, obvious, form is the equal division
of a particular good. Thus, for instance,
egalitarians believe that everyone should
have one vote in an election,5 and, more
generally, certain equal rights. But another
obviously egalitarian kind of principle is the
rejection of certain forms of discrimination.
Someone who rejects racial or sexual
discrimination is not necessarily calling for
the equal distribution of any particular good.
Thus the two forms are quite distinct.
Many principles of equality fall into one
of these two categories. Raz (1978) has tried
to demonstrate this rather formally, and I
think that with a little squeezing even the rich
complexity of principles listed by Rae et al
(1981) could be so accommodated. But I

]0 0 [][][]

or
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or

think

Raz is wrong

in excluding

a third

category of principle -- principles of universal
entitlement.

For it seems clear to me that

egalitarianism
universal

does include, for example, the

right to the satisfaction

of basic

needs and the right not to be degraded

or

exploited.

to

Raz's

central

objection

including such rights is that principles of this
form are not always egalitarian -- but this is
true,

as

well,

distribution

of

principles

of

equal

(e.g. equal food or, indeed, equal

welfare).
Principles
egalitarian
particular
people

of universal

entitlement

because they highlight,
context,

enjoy

situations

within a

in which some

the good in question

others do not.

This may suggest

strictly egalitarian

are

while
that the

content of such principles

is a principle of non-discrimination

-- if some

people have x, then all should -- but as Raz
points out, principles
are just

as well

everyone.

of non-discrimination

served

by denying

x to

That is clearly not the intention of

the principles mentioned above.
The fourth form of egalitarian principle
is perhaps the hardest for philosophers to take.
It states that a certain good should be more
equally

distributed,
][][] [][] [][][
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committing

itself to complete equality.

best example

is the principle

The

of greater

equality of income -- a principle shared by all
contemporary

egalitarians,

although

hardly
anybody believes in strictly equal incomes.6

What counts as 'more equal' is sometimes
difficult

question.

equality

are

egalitarian

But principles

a standard

tradition.

the ultimate

testimony

non-foundational,

of more

feature

Happily,

a

of

the

they are also

to its pluralistic,

and mutable character.

PART II: Elements of an account of economic
equality
11.1. Basic ideas
In the good old days, everyone

knew

what economic equality was. It was everyone
having the same income.

This idea is indeed

an important

for egalitarianism,

benchmark

but obviously will not do as a full account of
economic

equality.

always

recognised

would

be justified

needs.
tradition

There
that

For egalitarians
that

unequal

if people

have

incomes

had unequal

is also a strong

egalitarian

unequal

would

incomes

be

justified if they did no more than compensate
people for differences in their work.

1O0 [][][] m
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It is this

issue of compensation
about here.

which I'd like to talk

I shall refer to such a scheme as

a system of compensating
concentrating
from

many

differentials.

In

on this issue, I will abstract
other

elements

of economic

equality; not just the satisfaction of needs, but
also the principles

of democratic

control, of

access to decent work and self-development
(which

includes

choice),

freedom

and of sexual,

of occupational
racial,

and ethnic

equality.
The form of equality which best captures
and informs the idea of compensation
think,

that of an equality

is, I

in the overall

benefits and burdens of economic cooperation.
Since, in general, we have to think of work as
more or less burdensome
beneficial,

and of income as

such an equality

will generally

take the form of a system of compensating
differentials.

The

question

immediately

arises, however, as to how well defined any
such equality can be, since people do differ
dramatically
different

in their

preferences

among

forms of work, as well as on the

relative

values

they attach

to income

leisure.

What sense can be left to the very

idea of an overall equality?

][] [][][][] [][
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and

I don't want to deny the difficulties here;
and yet, it would be outrageous

to conclude

from them that a corporate executive with an
income of half a million dollars a year cannot
be compared

with

living on welfare

an unemployed
benefits.

The problem,

however, is to establish reasonable
comparison.

parent
terms for

Now, for well-known reasons, we

cannot resolve

the issue simply by setting

incomes so as to equalize welfare.

For much

the same reason, we cannot try to compensate
each person
preferences

according

to their

individual

between different kinds of work

and between work and leisure: we would end
up,

for

instance,

deliberately

chosen

compensating
'expensive'

people's
preferences

against certain kinds of work or against work
in general.
It is intuitively more plausible to think of
compensating

people

according

function of the complete

to some

set of individuals'

preferences.

For instance, we could set each

occupation's

rates of pay according

the typical

person

(defined

by mean

median or mode) would consider
adequate level of compensation
number of hours.?

to what
or

to be an

for a given

Or we could set a range of

legitimate rates of pay for each occupation,

m 0[][][]0[
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where the range

was defined,

middle two quartiles

say, by the

of preferences.

Such

proposals have their attractions, but also their
problems.

If a reliance

preferences

has

among

other

attention

been

things,

to people's

on

individUal

rejected

because,

it pays

inadequate

responsibility

for their

own preferences and overall aims in life, then
why should such preferences

enter into the

determination

at all, even by

of compensation

way of averaging?

People's preferences about

work will be shaped by many factors which
for just this reason it is intuitively implausible
to compensate

for, such as a personal taste

between

teaching

French,

or a desire

tradition.

and

to carryon

teaching
a family

The impact of these matters may

well disappear
but there
principle

English

in the process of averaging,

seems

to be a good reason

for not including

in

them in the first

place.
These last remarks suggest a procedure
similar to that adopted by Braybrooke (1987:
ch. 2) in his treatment
begin

by making

consideration
consider

of needs, namely to

a list

of the

which egalitarians

in thinking

about

('matters of compensation')

][] 0 [][][]0[
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kind

of

will want to
compensation

and then to apply
][][][]

O[][][

this list to particular occupations
levels

of

to establish

compensation.

compensation

Matters

of

will include the kind of thing

people have in mind when they distinguish
between

'impersonal'

or 'objective'

benefits

and burdens on the one hand and 'personal' or
'subjective'

needs

and preferences

on the

1987: 81-82).

On the

other (cf. Norman
burdens

side, some obvious

compensation

include

unavoidably

dangerous,

tedious,
Some

dirty,

whether

isolated,

plausible

candidates

for

the work is

tiring,

stressful,

or of low status.

examples

of

objective

benefits are job security, flexibility of hours,
and degree of autonomy.
As with need, the use of the concepts of
benefit

and burden

justifications

as publicly

for the distribution

accepted
of income

presupposes a common understanding,
a broad consensus
compensation

over

that is,

how the idea of

is to be applied.

What this

requires is not a complete agreement on the
truth of every claim of compensation,
what can be called a background

but

agreement

defined in terms of what people can accept as
reasonable claims, motivated not just by their
own direct assessment of these claims but by
their commitment to democracy and therefore

]0 D[][][] [][
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their willingness

to accept as reasonable

the

views of a substantial majority of their fellow
citizens.

The degree of applicability

of the

principle of compensation will be governed by
the degree of any such consensus:

the more

attitudes converge over matters and levels of
compensation,
for arguing
particular
degree

the more scope there will be
in detail

about

the justice

income differentials.
of

disagreement

of

Perhaps the
will

make

it

implausible to think about anything more than
a rough equality defined in terms of ranges or
bands

of legitimate

incomes

broad categories of work.

for different

At the limit, there

may be no more agreement than that no job is
so burdensome that it requires more than five
times

average

earnings

in compensation.

Even that would create a significant

social

role for the principle of compensation.
It is not my aim in this paper to discover
whether

the attitudes

contemporary

on compensation

societies

are

in

sufficiently

congruent to make a system of compensating
differentials
assessing
income.

a practicable
the justice

of a distribution

for
of

The shift from preferences to matters

of compensation
reason

standard

for

would seem to provide some

optimism,
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among

people with diverse conceptions of well-being
and

sets

of

considerable
objective

preferences
agreement

benefits
likely

and burdens,

agreement
reasonable

that

over

be

or at least

of such claims.

there
what

financial

may

over what count as

over the reasonableness
seems

there

would

It

be

would

less

count

compensation

as

for such

benefits and burdens; but here again it is not,
I hope, wholly implausible

to expect people's

views to fall within a fairly limited range, or
to think that they might be prepared to accept
certain

procedures

processes
compensation.
are

talking

considerably

for

or arbitrations
establishing

as fair

levels

of

We should remember that we
about

real

societies

less real diversity

than some

versions of liberalism presuppose.
these are empirical

with

But all of

issues which lie beyond

the scope of this paper. My point at present is
only that the degree of consensus does matter
for the usefulness

of compensation

as a

publicly acceptable criterion of justice.
also

worth

emphasizing

that

question here is the construction

what

It is
is in

of principles

for assessing the equality of a distribution
earnings, not the development
for implementing

lDO[][][]O[

of institutions

these principles.
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In what

follows,

I will assume

consensus

exists

that a very precise

because

expOSItIOn easier,

this

makes

the

but it is important

to

remember that even this degree of background
agreement

does

not

represent

preferences

but only a shared belief that a

certain set of differentials
reasonable

levels

identical

constitutes a set of

of relative

with respect to a reasonable

compensation
list of objective

benefits and burdens.
II.2 Compensation maps
What can we say, in general, about the
nature of such compensation?

The first point

worth making is that the amount of income
necessary to compensate for any form of work
will in general be an increasing

function of

the number of hours of work done: the more
work, the more pay.

('In general',

because

this assumes that more work is always more
burdensome,
case.)

which may not always be the

Moreover,

assume

that

since we can in general

income

has

a decreasing

marginal value and that time spent on work
has an increasing
can

plausibly

increasing
between

marginal
suppose

marginal
income

lD [][][][][][

onerousness,
that

rate

there

we

is an

of compensation

and hours of burdensome
23
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work.

Finally,

levels of compensation

always be relative

will

to points of comparison:

adequate compensation

for an additional five

hours' work will depend on prior levels of
work and income.
It might occur to anyone

who knows

even a little economics that what I have been
describing can be represented

by means of a

kind of indifference map, the curves of which
represent equalities of overall benefits and
burdens.8 Figure 1 illustrates such a map for
a particular kind of work.

income
(corn)

5

hours worked
Figure 1. A compensation

I

shall

henceforth

compensation
compensation

map for one kind of work

map
curves.

]0 0 [][][]

m

call
and

its

this

a

curves

My use of such maps
24
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will be purely informal and heuristic.
that it makes perfectly

Note

good sense for such

curves to terminate on the left at points of no
work and some income ('no-work points'), a
matter to which we will return.
worth

noting

bounded

that

the map is effectively

by some

curve

compensation

curve,

subsistence.

Below

S, not

itself

which represents

a

bare

S the compensation

function

is (to put
9
undefined.

it delicately)

Let us now consider
compensating

It is also

differentials

simply

how the idea of
ought to work in a

very simple case, where we have two people
producing

a single

productivity.lO

good

with a common

The elements of the situation

are a compensation

map and a production

function, as in Figure 2.

]0 0 [][][] [][
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income
(com)

Ya
Compensation
map

hours worKed
product
(com)

Production
function

..va hours worKed
Figure 2. An egalitarian dic;tribution for two people
with one kind of worK and l:ommon productivity
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Egalitarian distributions consist in A and
B

being

on

the

same

curve

of

the

compensation
map, constrained
by total
production. Thus, for instance, if A works w
a
hours and B works wb' the total product is
P

=

Pa + Pb.

An egalitarian

distribution

is

generated if P is divided as Ya and Yb. We
can perhaps

see the relationship

product

income

and

superimpose

more

the production

between

clearly

if we

function on the

compensation map, as in Figure 3.
income/
product
(corn)

hours wor1<ed

Wa

Figure 3. Another representation

In the illustrated
subsidizes

of Figure 2

case, A's production

B's consumption

so that the two

individuals end up equally well off. Note that
nothing has been said about what counts as an
optimal egalitarian distribution.

In particular,

it cannbt

an

be

lD 0 [][][]

assumed
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optimal

distribution

occurs when both parties are at

point Q, unless our aim is to maximize

the

overall level of objective benefits and burdens
for each individual
preferences.
.

aIm.

regardless

That, however,

of personal
is an unlikely

11

If we extend the example to include two
forms of work, we get a compensation map as
in Figure 4.
a

c

income
(corn)

bl-----

work 1

--work2

hours worked
Figure 4. A compensation

Here

work

1

map for two kinds of work

is

generally

less

burdensome than work 2. Note that the line
abc constitutes

for our purposes

a single

compensation curve, since all of the points on
this curve are considered

equal in overall

benefits and burdens to point b. Points on the
vertical axis -- no-work points -- thus have a

lD 0 [][][] or
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special analytical role in comparing levels of
compensation.

Figure

5 represents

an

egalitarian distribution in which both forms of
work are equally productive,

A does work 1

and B does work 2. B's income is in this case
subsidized by A's less burdensome work.

income/
product
(corn)

wb

-

work 1

--

work2

wa hours worked

Figure 5. Egaliitarian distribution for two people
with two kinds of work and common productivity

To complete our survey of the simplest
forms
(Figure

of compensation,

consider

a case

6) of one form of work with two

different levels of productivity, perhaps due to
different levels of skill. Pea) is A's production
curve and PCb) is B's.
productivity

Here it is A's greater

which subsidizes B's income so

that A and B are again left equally well off as
defined by the compensation map.

m 0 [][][]

Of
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0 Of

P(a)

incomel
product
(corn)

hours worked
Figure 6. Egalitarian distribution for two people
with one kind of work and two productivities

All of this discussion

has been for the

sake of defining what equality might mean;
how to interpret the very idea of an equality
of overall benefits and burdens.

I have said

nothing in this paper about what economic
practices

(if any) would

outcome.12
entirely

generate

In particular,
open

assumptions

I want to leave it

whether

given

certain

the best feasible approximation

to implementing
differentials

such an

a system of compensating

would rely heavily

mechanisms.

My

on market

aim is to clarify

the

question of how we should assess the equality
of a distribution

of earnings,

not how we

should put one into operation.

lO 0 [][][] or
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III. Arguing for Economic Equality
In the rest of this paper I want to say
something

about

how to argue

greater economic

equality,

for much

as interpreted

in

Part II. In Arguing for Equality I divide the
general case for equality into two parts. Part I
consists of the basic case for equality.

Part II

considers

issues,

some more controversial

such as whether equality is compatible
freedom and desert.

My question here is too

see how well these general arguments
to

the

specific

with

issue

of

a

apply

system

of

compensating differentials.
The basic case for equality, I maintain,
relies

on the ideas

community,

of need,

respect,

so let us take those

and

in turn.

Provision for needs requires, as we have seen,
that incomes

vary

according

to need.

It

thereby justifies

one kind of departure from

equal incomes.

Such departures nevertheless

can

be

thought

maintaining

of

as

necessary

for

an equality of overall condition.

Once basic needs are met, however, it may
be doubted whether the idea of need calls for
so stringent an equality as that defined by a
system of compensating

differentials.

In my

view the connection is an empirical one. It is
that a society

which

lDO[][][]O[
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inequality of economic condition -- of overall
benefits and burdens -- is unlikely to sustain a
commitment
everyone.

to

satisfying

the

needs

of

For a start, the better off are likely

to lack real sympathy with the worse off; at
the same

time,

they

influence

social

policy

institutionalizes
Admittedly

this

that

of

to

which

sympathy.

belief is at odds

of social
safety

inequalities.

democrats

who

to combine

net

with

a

huge

All I can say is that there is

little evidence
is

lack

it is possible

welfare-state

placed

in a way

this empirical

with generations
believe

are well

that this political programme

sustainable.

substantially

Certainly

undermined

it

has

been

in practically

every

country in which it has been applied.
The argument from respect has a similar
character.

Practically

everybody

these days

says that they believe in equal respect, but
there is precious little evidence of this respect
when you look out the window.
is that it is utopian
dramatically

My argument

to expect

superior

people

of

economic

circumstances

to sustain any real respect for

the worst off.

There are various reasons for

this, ranging from their inclination
their

privileges

JO 0 [][][] [][
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denigrating
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the

unprivileged
their

to their susceptibility

bargaining

power

to

to using

exploit

the

vulnerability of the weak.
The argument

from community

again, on empirical

observation,

relies,

this time

about the lack of a sense of social unity and
common interest in a highly unequal society.
It is a truism

of sociology

that different

classes develop different cultures and tend to
see each other as alien and incomprehensible.
If we care about a sense of community and a
common culture -- and admittedly only some
of us care very much about them -- then we
have a good reason for creating a society in
which the benefits and burdens of economic
activity are much more equally shared.
Without intending
central arguments

to rehearse even the

of the second part of my

book, I think it would be useful to connect a
few of them to the main issues I have been
talking about. One set of arguments has to do
with desert.

Unlike some egalitarians,

I am

not wholly skeptical about the idea of desert.
I am sure that the Center for the Study of
Ethics

in Society

deserves

inviting me to Kalamazoo,

my thanks

that George Bush

deserves to lose the 1992 election,
the Grand Canyon

JD0 [][JD m

deserves
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and that

its reputation.
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What I doubt is that the kinds of reason which
justify such claims do anything to justify the
scale of inequality

we have in our society.

When I doubt whether the chief executive of
General Motors deserves his income, that is
not a general skepticism
skepticism

about desert but a

about the validity of the grounds

which are offered

in defence

similar desert claims.

More pertinently to rest

of this paper, I do believe
economic

desert,

of that and

namely

in one kind of
that people

who

work hard deserve to be compensated
That belief is completely
idea

of

consistent

compensating

represents,

for it.
with the

differentials:

in fact, a convergence

it

between

the basic case for equality and the principle
of desert.
Turning

to the issue of freedom

and

equality, let me say fIrst of all that my basic
position

on this is the standard

egalitarian

one, namely that people's freedom to control
their own lives is very largely dependent on
their

material

conditions,

and

the

equality

and

difference

between

inequality

is simply the difference

promoting

some

economic

that

people's

freedom

between
at the

expense of others' and promoting the freedom
of all.

What is special about the idea of a

JDO[][][]O[
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system

of compensating

differentials,

as

opposed to some popular images of equality,
is the way that it respects
freedom which opponents
only

to be respected

society.

two forms

of equality

of

claim

in an inegalitarian

First, it respects

freedom of occupational

the principle

choice.

of

It does not

enslave the talented; but unlike our society, it
does not enslave the poor, either.

Secondly,

it allows for a wide range of choice over
preferences between consumption
Obviously
sustain

an egalitarian

today's

and leisure.

society would not

lifestyles

of the rich

and

famous, but on my view it would allow people
with champagne

tastes to work harder than

others for more income, and let people with a
preference
lower

for leisure

incomes.

work less and have

Thus

egalitarian

society

uniformity

is completely

the

image

as a society
contrary

of an
of dull
to the

principles I've been expounding.
Let me finally say something about the
argument, popularly associated with Rawls13,
that

inequality

can

benefit

providing the incentives

everyone

necessary

by

to ensure

that talented people go where they're needed
and that workers make a real effort in their
jobs.

I cannot pursue this question here, but I
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will

make

one point.

Egalitarianism

is

standardly accused of reducing the incentive
to work, on the assumption that people will be
paid the same whether

they work or not.

Under a system of compensating

differentials,

however, that assumption

is false.

the

would

very

least,

disincentive

people

to work within

Thus, at
have

less

such a system

than in a system of equal incomes.

There is

much more to be said about the whole issue
of incentives -- some of which I try to say in
my book -- but that would go well beyond the
immediate concerns of this paper.
IV. Conclusion
In this paper I have tried to do something
negative

and

something

negative

work

was to clear

philosophical

prejudices

way of constructing
theory.

The

away certain

which stood in the

an adequate

The positive

small contribution

positive.

egalitarian

work was to make a

to deciding what we mean

when we talk about balancing out income and
work,

and

arguments

to say

something

available

for

about

supporting

account of economic equality.

the
that

I hope I have

at the least made it clear that once one has
discarded simplistic accounts of what equality

m 0 [][][] 0[
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is, then the whole process of giving an
adequate
account
becomes
rather
complicated.
We shouldn't find that too
daunting. The world is, after all, a rather
complicated place.
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Notes
1. Wittgenstein 1968: sec. 115. It should
be obvious that the whole character of part I
of this paper is inspired by the P hiIosophical
Investigations; such specific cross-references
as seem useful are indicated in parentheses
by section number, e.g. PIllS.
2. I would like to thank Vincent Browne,
G.A. Cohen, and R.M. Hare for their
comments on a previous draft of part 1 of this
paper, which was presented to the XVIII
World Congress of Philosophy. The ideas in
part II of this paper have developed through
several incarnations and with many people's
help. I would particularly like to thank Brian
Barry, G.A. Cohen, Keith Graham, Attracta
Ingram, Richard Norman, Prasanta Pattanaik,
Jennifer Todd and Philippe Van Parijs for
their advice and criticism. I also wish to
thank the Department of Philosophy at the
State University of New York at Stony Brook
for granting me a research associateship for
the year 1991-92 and the Center for the Study
of Ethics at Western Michigan University for
their warm welcome and for helpful
comments on this paper when delivered. Part
II is based on a section of my paper 'An
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Egalitarian Case for Basic Income', in Van
Parijs 1992 and appears
permission of the editor.

with the kind

3. The conception of egalitarianism as
equal well-being endorsed by Landesman
(1983) is more sophisticated than Mortimore's
and more
sensitive
to real-world
egalitarianism. But while I see 'equal wellbeing' or (for preference) 'equality of
condition' as a way of summarizing a plurality
of views, Landesman sees 'equal well-being'
as a 'root' principle which those ideas merely
elaborate. This picture of the conceptual
landscape seems to me a distortion stemming
from the philosophical inclinations criticised
in this paper.
4. Recent examples are Arneson 1989
and Cohen 1989. These theories are much
more complicated than those discussed in the
text and would take much more space to
unravel, but I believe that neither fully
captures the egalitarian outlook.
5. It was not always so, as I.S. Mill's
endorsement of plural voting demonstrates
(1972: ch 8). Yet Mill was clearly an
egalitarian in his day.
6. A recent exception is Gilbert 1990;
see pp. 277-283, 332-332. Carens (1981) uses
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strictly equal incomes for analytical purposes,
without committing himself to this as a basic
principle. In Carens 1985 he argues that there
is no practical difference between equal
incomes and compensatory ones because
under existing and likely conditions both
principles
imply the same policy of
progressive taxation and redistribution.
7. lowe this suggestion to Philippe Van
Parijs.
8. I would like to thank Prasanta
Pattanaik for kindly leading me towards this
point. Let me apologize now to people who
find the next few pages unbearably simple.
9. The slight slope in S represents the
assumption that subsistence needs increase
with work. S is not a compensation curve
because working longer hours for subsistence
is more burdensome than working shorter
hours for it.
10. For the sake of simplicity,

the

discussion here and for the rest of the paper
assumes that labour is the only factor of
production, and obviously needs refining for
an economy with other inputs.
Without
wanting to anticipate such refinements, it is
worth pointing out that most egalitarians are
unimpressed by the argument that returns to

lDDODom
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capital represent compensation for deferred
consumption and thus would resist the use of
the principle of compensation to justify such
returns. This is, indeed, one of the reasons
why egalitarians tend to be socialists. The
questions
all of this raises for the
arrangements for investment in a socialist
economy are serious, but well beyond the
scope of this paper.
11. It is more plausible to assume that an
optimal distribution must at least be Paretooptimal, although that would need to be
argued for, too. It would be easy to show that
the simple examples put forward in this
section are not Pareto-optimal on all possible
sets of preferences, but more difficult, I hope,
to show that a complex system of
compensating differentials in an actual
society would be substantially
Paretosuboptimal.
12. I am thus putting to one side the very
serious objections to compensatory justice
raised by Carens 1985. I am not sure that
these objections can be overcome, but I do
think that the ideas in this paper give a
stronger sense to the idea of compensation
than the treatment in Carens's article.
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13. There is a curious anomaly about
work and income in Rawls's overall theory.
Rawls says that justice has to do with
distributing the benefits and burdens of social
cooperation, but the two principles concern
only the benefits -- the primary goods. So
they only cover half the question, and in
particular fail to distinguish inequalities of
income which compensate for inequalities of
work (or, indeed, of need) from those which
represent differences in overall economic
condition.
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Kalamazoo, Michigan
VOLUMEVI
No.1, November, 1992
Arguing for Economic Equality

John Baker
University College, Dublin, Ireland
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FALL 1992 PUBLIC PRESENTAIONS
Sept. 18

Bart Gruzalski
Department of Philosophy
Northeastern University
Future Generations and the
Sustainable Imperative to Live

Oct. 19

Howard Zinn
Professor Emeritus
Boston University
A New Foreign Policy: Justice
without War

Oct. 26

Carl Cohen
Philosophy, Residential
College, and Medical School
University of Michigan
Is There a Right to Health Care?
and
In Defense of the Use of Animals
in Medical Research

Oct. 28

DeWitt C. Baldwin, M.D.
Scholar-in- Residence
American Medical Association
Ethics and National Health Care
Reform: A Vision for the Future

Nov. 5

Eugene Spafford
Department of Computer
Sciences
Purdue University
Current Ethical Issues in
Computer Education
and
Ethical Issues in Computing for
the University Community
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Nov. 6

Shirley Bach
Department of Philosophy
Western Michigan University
John Dircks, M.D.
Bronson Hospital
Stephen Jefferson, M.D.
Borgess Medical Center
The Problem of Futility in Medical
Treatment

Nov. 10

Howard Wolpe
United States House of
Representatives
Ethics in Government

Nov. 30

Dylan Schmorrow
Graduate Student in
Psychology and Philosophy
Western Michigan University
Questions Involving Traditional
Uses of Non-Human Animals:
AnExamination of Ethical and
Environmental Concerns
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